This article intends to provide responses to some of the many unanswered questions about the making and the transformation of the uprising in Syria by exploring a new avenue of research: media development aid. Most of the academic interest has been oriented towards the role that the new media played at the time of the uprising, insufficient interest, instead, has been directed to the development of the sector in the years predating it. What emerges from this article is that the Syrian media landscape was strongly supported by international development aid during the years prior the outbreak of the uprising of 2011. By looking at the complex structure of media aid architecture and investigating into the practices and programs implemented by some representative organisations, this article reflects on the field of media development as a new modus operandi of the West (EU and US especially), to promote democracy through alternative and non-collateral bottomup support.
exacerbating the fight, instilling fear in the enemy and intimidating the adversary, while proselyting.
By going beyond the dichotomy that frames the media as a deus ex-machina of the uprising or conversely, as a means of its expression, this paper attempts to draw attention on the leverage and role that West's media aid assistance had in fostering popular mobilization in Syria and to many extents, the rest of the region. Indeed, within the greater debate around the roots of what has been called the 'Arab Spring', very little attention has indeed been given to the change of the media scene in the years that predated the outbreak of the uprising and in specific to the role of international aid assistance to the media sector.
The phenomenon of media aid industry in Syria as much as in other geographical contexts has never generated extensive academic interests. Interestingly, if literature on media development can be defined as nascent at its very best, its practice marked what has been Western foreign policy programs since the second War World (Colle, 2002) . 1 Communication and information technologies have always been considered having beneficial effects on democracy promotion and economic development of developing countries, based on the assumption that the more citizens are empowered to make informed choices, the better the media serve democracy (Sakr, 2004 ). 2 However, foreign aid investment in the media sector has seen a visible investment in the past decade given the potentials that the new information and communication technologies of the last generation seem to offer in terms of interrupting the state's monopoly over the means of information and offering citizens' empowerment in contexts unfavourable to democratic values (Hoffer, 2002) . 3 This type of Western support has proved pivotal in mobilising populations to overthrow repressive regimes in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Lebanon, only to mention a few (Kumar, 2006) . 4 Today Western governments are investing huge sums in media projects in Arab countries, to the point that, as Bruce Stanely holds, such intervention has become an industry (Stanely, 2007) . 5 In this regard, not enough rigorous research and scholarship exists about the integration of new media and information assistance by development actors (EU countries and US) as part of their democracy promotion programmes implemented in perspective democracies. This type of analysis is, to a greatextent, inexistent concerning the Middle East, despite the added value it would offer to the understanding of the causes that brought to the turbulent events of 2011.
By looking at the media aid architecture in Syria, this paper investigates into the role and praxis of a number of donors and contractors that intervened in the country. The article consists of two parts. The first, more descriptive, intends at framing the concept of media development within the wider literature and understanding the way it has been implemented in other historical periods and geographical frameworks. The second part, more analytical, focuses on Syria's media aid architecture, the actors involved, the projects that have been implemented and the impact this mechanism produces on a rather closed society like Syria. Ultimately, the chapter attempts to locate this issue within the broader and unfinished debate about the role and effects of international assistance in fragile contexts where humanitarianism and development are not simply conveying international altruism but at times favouring political ends.
Defining Media development
Before getting into the analysis of the media aid industry in pre-revolutionary Syria, it would be appropriate to dwell on the concept and significance of media development. The Centre for
International Media Assistance (CIMA) refers to the term 'media development' to indicate the efforts by organisations, people and governments to develop the capacity and quality of the media sector within a specific country or region. 6 The actors engaged in this field can range from governments, to multilateral organisations and large number of national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In general, these actors are classified in two categories: donors, referring to those who provide funding and intermediaries, indicating those organisations that design and implement projects, often in cooperation with local partners in the recipient country.
As earlier mentioned, in the past 20 years, the expenditure in media development assistance by Western agencies has skyrocketed, reaching an estimated $ 645 million in 2010 (Nelson, Pena, 2012 ). 7 The increase investment in the sector has occurred in concomitance or as an effect of the emergence of the new media technologies, which have proved meeting the needs and requests of international actors better than what had been with traditional ones. The promotion of free and independent media around the world takes many forms: journalist training and education;
improving the legal environment for media; funding new media outlets or improving existing ones; media literacy training, digital and cyber-security training; infrastructure development. 8 Media development projects are often difficult to investigate as organizations supporting media projects very often do not have a separate office or division in charge of media development portfolio, including media assistance under broader headings, such as 'democracy and governance', 'capacity building', 'human rights' or 'civil society' (i.e. European Commission). In the words of Eric Newton, senior adviser at the Knight Foundation, supporting media assistance aid is far more important than supporting a vaccination's campaign, as 'you can't get the vaccine in someone's mouth until you get in that someone's head the idea that the vaccine is good for you' (Moller, 2009). 9 Therefore, funding media projects becomes a means to face the problem from its roots, by creating the conditions for the solution of the problem from within, with no direct external intervention, at least not formally. When applied to developing countries with non-democratic institutions, the promotion of media literacy acts as a tool to make better informed citizens, who can pressure governments to become accountable and to uproot corruption. Under these conditions, media development becomes a means soft power, according to Nye's definition as the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce, as a means of persuasion, through intangible means like culture, values and institutions of politics. 10
Media development assistance in the Middle East
The West's promotion of media development assistance in the Middle East is not a newly adopted policy but a concept, albeit differently, that dates back to the Cold War era, when the Middle East had been transformed into a confrontational battle ground between the United States and the USSR, a reality (alas!) not that far from the present time. The two superpowers were fighting to win the hearts and the minds of the 'new nations' of the postcolonial world by providing them with modernisation projects (Shah, 2011 (Sakr, 2006) . 16 Therefore, the international community became more aware of the need to develop new strategies of democracy promotion, which could engage and build partnership with non-governmental Arab groups and local citizens and build links across Middle Eastern countries. 17 Today the two largest providers of democracy assistance are the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the European Commission (EC). 18 The principal areas of democracy building that the West has been engaging with in the Middle East are elections and electoral processes; political parties; judicial reforms; civil society and the media. At the core of these programmes, there is a common intent to raise people's communication and information literacy, which are considered to be at the base of any regime change.
Syria's Media Aid Architecture
Looking at the media aid industry in Syria, opens a new avenue to the study of the role and purpose of media assistance programs in a country that witnessed a wide-scale popular uprising in 2011 and which heavily relied on the use of new media. This article examines the impact of media assistance projects in Syria under the presidency of Bashar al-Asad, which coincided with a period of great changes for Syria, given the reforms carried out by the new president, the new agreements signed with foreign countries, the establishment of a private sector, the spread of satellite dishes and
Internet connections and, most importantly, a population of young people, increasingly educated and yet underemployed who could become fruitful resources in whom to invest. 19 This dynamic and yet vulnerable political system, created the right conditions for foreign investment in the media sector, with the intent of raising the country's media literacy and empower local civil society actors.
According to the Directory of Development Organizations, in 2011 a total of 107 development organisations operated in Syria, consisting of international organizations, government institutions, private sector support organisations (including fair-trade), finance institutions, training and research centres, civil society organisations, developing consulting firms and information providers.
However, the actual number of actors involved in development programmes was higher, given the often-unofficial way to operate that many organisations adopted in the Syrian context. For instance, media development programmes have often opted for non-government approved ways to perform in Syria, on the basis that the field of operation was too sensitive and risky. Despite the openings that the newly elected president Bashar al-Asad promoted at the start of his presidency, the regime kept a strict control both over foreign funding and over organisations working in the development sector.
The main tactic adopted by the regime to control the work of civil society organisations was to perform as principal promoter and funder of these organisations, a cunning expedient to reinvigorate the regime's image abroad and at home, while also guaranteeing monitoring of these organisations'
activities. In these circumstances, donors had two possible options to operate in Syria: one official, with the regime's approval and one unofficial, more difficult to realise, which consisted in having to operate underground, on-line or by training Syrians abroad (Taki, 2012) . 20 The aid structure through which media development programmes are put in place is a complex mechanism that varies according to the specific case. A simplified version ( Figure 1 ) of this structure would be organised in terms of structure and level of participation (Price, Noll, De Luce, 2002). 21 In this graphic, the flow of funds comes from donors (rich governments or individuals), it then reaches agencies (multilateral institutions), and it is at this point funnelled to the recipient country through the implementers (NGOs, local partners, etc.). 22 The standard map includes donors and donees, governments, quasi-governmental organisations and NGOs, funders, intermediaries, local partners. Some actors participate in more than one stage.
in aid, both as donors and as implementers of non-governmental organisations. In addition, if the recipient country is an authoritarian state, as in the case of Syria, it may hamper activities that appear politicised or viewed as jeopardising its stability. In this case, some organisations resort to a ploy to dupe the regime's restrictions, by working behind the backs of governments, implementing projects underground, on-line or working with citizens (Syrian diaspora) outside their national borders.
Donors
The analysis of Syria's media aid architecture might not exactly appear intriguing if it is limited to presenting the profile of specific actors, without examining the projects funded and with them, the effects they produce. For this reason, this paper opts to limit the analysis to the two main donors involved in Syria's media aid architecture, underlining the specific area of competence and operation, while leaving more space to the analysis of the projects implemented by a number of organisations in the years under study.
Support for independent media is the main field of action of the European Commission (EC) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Both agencies are famously known for the byzantine and often intricate, if not obscure structure of their organisation, which makes at times very difficult any attempt to track specific projects or funding. Media development projects are particularly difficult to track, as they are scattered across different sectors and funding instruments.
It is rather emblematic that media aid programmes, which are aimed at enhancing freedom of expression and transparency, are at times so obscure and secretive.
The EC and USAID have implemented media assistance programmes directed at developing independent press and broadcasting, strengthening the professionalization of media producers and outlets, supporting reform of the media legislation, establishing networks of information and interregional exchange of information on human rights. However, the media sector has not been the main recipient of assistance or the target of development programmes, but rather the vehicle to achieve far-reaching goals such as to increase citizens' participation in politics, strengthen the respect of human rights and democratise institutions. In fact, media development projects fall under the voice of broader sectors such as 'social development and democratisation', 'civil society', 'human rights and democracy'. Interestingly, both organisations have increased their investment in media assistance programmes, with a noticeable shift towards the Middle East in the past decade. In particular, USAID has a long history of investing in media assistance programmes, with a focus on programmes in Syria were aimed at the production, broadcasting and distribution of new and existing television and radio programmes and the distribution of Internet-based media products;
training programmes provided by the European Neighbourhood Journalism network; establishing of online networks between media producers; producing of audio-visual products promoting intercultural dialogue. 24 Similarly, USAID's assistance projects, including media development, are implemented under Step' -a programme produced by Syrian dissident group based in the US -progressively becoming reference for many antagonists of the regime.
Contractors

BBC Media Action
The BBC Media Action represents an important player in the field of media development in Syria. Despite the high level of competence and successful history of international media assistance, Syria has not been an easy ground to work, given the regime's tight supervision and the suspicion overlooking any foreign activity.
The The deteriorating reality in Syria, with a popular uprising turning into a civil conflict, obliged many international organisations to freeze their programmes. This was the case for the BBC Media Action, which with the increase of violence in Syria, decided to step aside for some time, feeling, in the words of Taki, very nervous of any involvement in such circumstances. When it became clear that the Syrian conflict was far from ending anytime soon, the BBC Media Action decided to change the nature of its projects, the targets and the location of its trainings. This means that media assistance projects have tried to meet the information needs of the refugees inside and outside refugee camps, offer practical advice and restore values of peace and solidarity forgotten during the conflict. 32 
The Institute for War and Peace Reporting
The and cultural news. Rather than covering breaking news, the website presents in-depth coverage of issues related to civil society, refugees, human rights, justice and more recently the dire reality of the Syrian conflict. 36 The CyberArabs website instead addresses a wider audience, targeting issues of cyber security and delivering up-to date information on the latest digital security threats. 37 In 2010, the regime imposed strict surveillance on suspicious activities, limiting progressively the operational activity of organisations like IWPR. Under the ultimatum of the regime, IWPR decided to re-locate to Beirut and set up its trainings from there. According to Fischer, the regime had been aware of their activities before 2010, but it somehow tolerated their presence, seen as non-hazardous. Indeed, most of the articles that the trainees wrote had been intentionally uploaded on-line in English (whether they were written in English in the first place or translated afterwards), in order to draw less attention and fuel less hatred from the government. Despite this shrewdness, the often politicised stances that some of the articles acquired, especially when covering human rights issues, made the government Since the outbreak of the uprising, IWPR has been very cautious with its operation, relocating all the trainings to Lebanon (Beirut), Turkey (Istanbul and Gaziantep)and only recently in the Syria's liberated areas.
Arab Reports for Investigative Journalism
Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) is the first and only non-profit organisation in the region dedicated to promoting investigative journalism. The Amman-based organization was established in 2005 to support 'independent quality professional journalism, through in-depth journalism projects, and offering media coaching.' 38 The organisation has been working in the field of print, radio, TV and on-line media in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, carried out trainings that were not focused only on investigative reporting but they more broadly encompassed more general knowledge on how to write a news story, how to use online databases to dig for accurate information and how to make use of social-media and how to produce video reporting.
The legal support offered by the organisation constitutes a precious factor for many journalists in Syria, who have this far been strongly limited by a mechanism of self-censorship, fearing to overstep redlines. Rana Sabbagh-Gargour, ARIJ executive director, stressed that ARIJ's trainings were and are not political, 'our ultimate goal is to teach a new, professional technique that journalists can apply to any issue that they deem to be of public concern'. 41 In fact, most investigative reports that Syrian journalists have published, through ARIJ, have covered issues affecting the lives of the Syrian public, like an increase in child sexual abuse, public health risks from environmental waste to illnesses due to family inter-marriages or the increase number of women working in the private sector with no social insurance. Hattar explained that Syrian journalists have been offered weekly trainings, workshops at their headquarters in Amman and one-to-one mentoring and continual supervision of investigations. 42 In return, those trained had to spend extensive hours on investigative fieldwork, which included anything from interviews, archival research and data collection, all of which required their steadfastness to overcome bureaucratic obstacles limiting access to information.
ARIJ has been carrying out impressive work that is not just introducing a new type of journalism, a novelty in the region, but it is trying the update the Arab educational system, which is outdated and which has produced a largely apolitical, a-critical thinking generation. ARIJ has not stopped working since the outbreak of the Arab revolts and despite the hardships that the present political unrest has brought, investigative journalism seems to be gaining more ground as a tool to investigate and disclose recent cases of money laundering, political corruption and organised crime (Bajec, 2012) . 43 
Conclusion
Remarking upon what was said at the beginning of this article, this study presents a glimpse of a sector that is understudied and provides a new tile in the mosaic of the Syrian pre-uprising decade and to the many unanswered questions regarding the seeds of the popular revolts. This study argues that the Syrian uprising broke out as an effect of a number of contextual factors, among which the expansion of the Syrian media landscape played a dominant role. The growth of the sector resulted as an effect of the country's opening to the new media technologies and to modest institutional reforms affecting the sector, but also as a result of foreign aid projects. Media assistance projects contributed to the improvement of the media sector, supporting newly established media outlets, reforming existing ones, expanding social media use, improving the quality and quantity of news, as well as journalists' professionalism. What is more telling, media development positively affected civil society activism, empowering new civil actors in the use of new technologies to push the government's red lines further, to explore the information horizon offered by the Internet and to transform the online space in platforms to reclaim their rights and get involved in civil and political issues. The effects produced by media assistance projects were most probably beyond the implementers' expectations and the projects' objectives. Yet, the media aid industry found a particular favourable astral moment during the presidency of Bashar al-Asad. In fact, the president had proved to be more inclined to open a dialogue with Western countries, within limits, aware that compromise had to be signed in order to avoid an Iraq-style scenario. On the other hand the US shifted its strategy from military confrontation to smart means for leverage, among which new media occupied a most prominent role.
Initially, media assistance projects did not produce immediate, far-reaching results. In this sense, Maan Adul Salam, the owner of Etana Press -an online portal on women's issues funded by a variety of international organizations -argued that the Internet provided a window to the world, but did not make any change at the end (Eisenlohr, Cavatorta, 2012). 44 However, the empirical evidence from Syria demonstrates how, with time, the cyberspace 'activated' citizens, producing an important counter-discourse to the regime's official one. The effect of media assistance aid did not reflect on the whole society, but only on a minority directly involved in the media trainings, whether as journalists, activists or institutions. However, this minority played a decisive role in connecting with ordinary citizens off-line, stimulating civic awareness and political participation and creating a fertile terrain that could be exploited for off-line mobilisation at the right time.
This assertion entails that the West's foreign aid investment is not driven by development aims exclusively, but by broader political aims, among which to destabilize unfriendly regimes account for a strategic one. Syria burst into a revolt before this policy was uncovered. However, in countries like Cuba, these techniques have been short-lived. The multi-million dollar program of USAID, disguised as humanitarian aid, established an anti-regime social-network called ZunZuneo designed to spark political dissent. The attempt failed when the authorities discovered about it in early 2014. 45 Interestingly, now that the Cuban and US administration have seen a historic rapprochement, US's attempts to destabilize the Castro's regime through media development projects, like Radio and TV Martì, broadcasting from Miami since the late 80s, are now scrambling to stay relevant as the relationship between the two countries is showing signs of improvement. 46 The denial of media assistance programmes by international agencies and Western governments does not hold water in Syria, as well as for the rest of the region. The high numbers of activists and journalists trained by international organisations are a clear proof of this multifaceted strategy. A well-known Tunisian blogger, Ben Gharbia complained in September 2010 about the role of Western governments using digital activists to achieve their geopolitical goals and foment unrest.
He affirmed that Western funding programmes were the 'kiss of death' for Arab activists, as their anti-regime activities would sooner or later put their life in danger and the support that Western governments had offered them would dissipate. As Rolf Paasch of Friedrich Ebert Foundation stated, 'I personally find it very problematic to use journalists to drive an agenda. There is a value in journalism in and of itself. If I use the media to drive my agenda, the government can do the same.
It's actually a bad precedent' (Alcorn, 2011) . 47 Rami Nakhle, a well-known Syrian activist who became one of the spokesmen of the Syrian revolution, was able to escape from the pitchfork of the regime and move to Beirut and then off to the US. 48 if you see a computer, you must be organized, and you cannot be chaotic and be good with a computer. The technology was created to make things easier and faster, and we need to make things easier and faster in this country' (Eisenlohr, 2011). 50 
